How Serious Are the Real Problems with Starlink and Other Operators in Ukraine?

How widely is Starlink actually being used by the enemy? Could a Shahed drone tomorrow already be flying with Amazon LEO or OneWeb onboard? How should this problem be addressed?

The issue of Starlink being used by Russian forces is, in reality, far broader and more complex than it is usually presented in typical media coverage. And it truly requires an urgent solution. Moreover, this is no longer a Starlink-only problem. Why? Let’s try to break it down—and at the same time understand what can be done about it.

The Scale of the Starlink Problem

The issue of Starlink being used on enemy drones, which SkyLinker has written about repeatedly, is only part of a much larger problem. Recently, SpaceX published a report on Starlink’s achievements in 2025 and distributed it via email to all customers. This report was also analyzed in the article “Starlink 2025–2026: The Path to Global Hegemony”.

The poster for that publication deliberately used an image taken directly from this report—an image that went largely unnoticed by the media. Unfortunately so, because it is actually well worth paying attention to.

“heat map” of Starlink’s presence on the planet from the Starlink Progress Report 2025 document

If you look closely, the image is a typical “heat map” of Starlink terminals’ presence across the planet. Such maps are usually generated automatically using real service usage data. Of course, the scale and generation algorithms are supposedly designed to exclude anything that could be considered sensitive or undesirable — but in the case of Ukraine and the neighboring aggressor state, we can see some rather interesting details.

As in similar maps from previous years, there is a clear concentration of Starlink terminals along the Line of Contact. However, there is one fundamental difference: in the temporarily occupied territories — and in some adjacent areas — it is no longer “dark,” but very noticeably “bright.” Given the scale of the map, each visible dot does not represent a single terminal, but rather a cluster of terminals. While it is impossible to calculate exact numbers, it is entirely possible to assess the unexpectedly large scale.

Enlarged and processed map of Starlink presence in Ukraine and nearby, from an image from the Starlink Progress Report 2025 document

When zooming in and processing the relevant areas, several striking observations emerge:

• A significant number of Starlink terminal concentration points are visible both along the coast and deep inside the Crimean Peninsula.

• Many such “points” are present on the territory of the aggressor state near Crimea.

• Virtually all temporarily occupied territories show a high concentration of Starlink terminals—not merely comparable, but in some places even denser than areas under Ukrainian control close to the Line of Contact.

• The Line of Contact itself now appears with a more or less symmetrical intensity, indicating comparable levels of Starlink usage on both sides.

Many more interesting conclusions could be drawn. All the sources used are publicly available.

Of course, using this map as definitive proof would be incorrect. Nevertheless, it clearly illustrates the scale of the problem and raises serious questions about Starlink’s availability in certain neighboring territories—particularly in places where it should not be available at all.

Thus, the issue of Russian drones using Starlink is only one part of a much broader and systemic problem, regardless of what some may claim.

No Longer Just Starlink

Right now, beta testing of Amazon’s new LEO satellite network is already underway, with launch preparations scheduled for March. During 2026, several other LEO satellite projects are expected to come online as well. Even today, satellites from various LEO constellations are already flying over us — including Turkish, Chinese (Geespace, GuoWang, Qianfan), European, and American systems.

Do we currently have confidence that the enemy is not using these systems right now, just as they use Starlink?

Amazon LEO Nano terminal, even smaller than Starlink Mini. Image from leo.amazon.com

No, we do not. Worse still, at present we do not even have the tools to influence this possibility. Ukraine’s satellite telecommunications domain is effectively unprotected. There was no urgent need for such protection before the rapid expansion of satellite constellations. Moreover, in 2022, the government further relaxed regulations specifically to simplify the use of Starlink, OneWeb, and other satellite communication systems. Drones equipped with satellite terminals appeared only later.

In other words, the problem today is that we have neither defined boundaries nor protection mechanisms in a critically important domain—satellite communications. And this issue is no longer just about Starlink. It is not particularly important which operator controls the next Shahed drone that strikes a train, a power substation transformer, or a residential building. What matters is what we do now to make such usage significantly more difficult overall.

What Should Be Done?

The question of what should be done has a multi-page answer, and most of those pages are obviously not suitable for public discussion at this stage. Moreover, their content may change fundamentally, be expanded, or supplemented over time.

However, the most important step that must be taken immediately is to declare—to the entire world and to all satellite operators—that Ukraine’s satellite telecommunications domain is critically important and requires protection and regulation. In other words, a political and strategic decision must be made.

Photo from the Telegram channel of Mikhailo Fedorov, 2022

All other actions fall under the operational and tactical levels, where planning and implementation become possible. Some of these steps will certainly take time. But some can be implemented right now—including solutions that would simply prevent the aggressor from using Starlink and other systems as massively and systematically as is happening today.

If we continue to delay and try to “sort things out” or “somehow negotiate” with operators, as has been done before, the result will be the same: Ukraine will remain dependent on a narrow circle of individuals who are able to “make things happen” and who have exclusive contacts with those they can “negotiate” with. In other words, we will keep stepping on the same rake again and again — next year, and ten years from now.

Ukraine has the potential to set an example for the entire world on how to properly implement SatCom regulations for security and protection. But right now, we are being overtaken not only by Poland, Israel, or Kazakhstan, but even by Nigeria, India, and Indonesia — all of which are already introducing one form or another of SatCom regulation, first and foremost targeting Starlink. If they can do it, why can’t we?

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