Starlink, OneWeb, Kuiper - A Deep Analysis and Comprehensive Comparison
History, specifics and features, business models and positioning, technical details and technological differences - all in a large but very interesting analytical review
This extensive analytical article contains a deep analysis and comparison of the current leaders in low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite communication - Starlink, OneWeb, and Kuiper. A detailed review of their features, history, and specifics not only provides a complete picture of them but also an understanding of why comparing them solely by the number of satellites is simply inappropriate.
Introduction. Why “counting satellites” is not the point
There is a temptation to judge LEO networks by eye: whoever has more satellites is stronger. But networks are not a zoo of metal boxes in the sky. They are complex systems with their own traffic logic, spectrum limitations, resource allocation policies, ground infrastructure, terminal generations, and a hundred other quiet engineering decisions that determine whether a specific user in a crowded city will get their stable 50–200 Mbps or see “network busy” on the screen. The number of satellites is only one consequence of the chosen architecture, not its quality.
Therefore, in this material, we will not count “who has the longer and thicker” list of launches. We will break down three different approaches - Starlink, OneWeb, and Kuiper - and show how orbital architecture, inter-satellite links, frequency allocation, the flexibility of antenna beams, ground gateways, and ecosystem strategy form real capacity and user experience. And why two projects with the same “number of satellites” can differ dramatically during peak load over a metropolis or on a busy air route.
What exactly we are comparing (and what won’t be here)
To avoid mixing apples and oranges, let’s immediately define the scope. We are talking about broadband internet access - stationary and mobile (land/sea/air), where throughput, latency, stability, and network scale are important.
We deliberately do not include adjacent but different-class areas:
Direct-to-Cell / NTN - direct communication with mass-market smartphones, where the link budgets, antennas, and service compromises are different.
IoT / M2M - low-bandwidth telemetry services prioritizing energy efficiency, not throughput per user.
Specialized PNT/A-PNT services (time and position from space), which have a different metric of utility.
Niche state-military channels with non-standard requirements and classified technical specifications.
These areas are interesting and important, but they address different consumption circles and require a separate analysis. If you mix them with broadband access, the comparison will be flawed - like comparing a backpack radio modem with a backbone router on a single scale.
How to read this text
We will proceed from the systemic picture to the specifics: a brief historical context, followed by orbital architecture and inter-satellite links, spectrum and regulation, antennas and beams, ground gateways and the cloud, terminals, operation in “hot zones,” the strategy and ecosystem of each player, generation integration, and finally, factors of resilience. Along the way, we will explain why certain engineering choices (for example, ISL with high throughput or flexible beam-hopping in Ka/Ku) give a better result than simply “adding 200 more satellites.”
The ultimate goal is simple: to provide a tool for a smart comparison - not “how many satellites,” but “where, for whom, and at what cost real capacity and service quality are provided.”
Historical Overview
LEO constellations did not appear yesterday. This is a story of gradual waves, in each of which ambitions, money, and technologies clashed. When we see three names today - Starlink, OneWeb, and Kuiper - it is important to remember that they did not start at the same time and with the same resources. These are different generations of the same race.
OneWeb started earlier than everyone else. It became the first “big” project of the second wave of satellite internet. Its first satellites appeared in orbit when Starlink was still in the presentation stage. But the technology laid down in Gen1 quickly turned out to be outdated: the satellites are light, without optical inter-satellite links, with fixed beams, and strictly dependent on a dense network of gateways. This choice was logical in the mid-2010s, but against the backdrop of subsequent progress, it looks like a limitation. Today, OneWeb is more trying to “seamlessly” transition to the next generation than to compete on an equal footing with newer architectures.
Starlink appeared a little later but immediately in a different league. First, SpaceX had its own rockets and could launch a hundred satellites in one go, removing the main barrier - the cost of access to orbit. Second, from the very beginning, the network was built on the ideas of scalability and upgradability: from Gen1 with simpler terminals to Gen2 with laser links and a wider spectrum. This created the effect of a “mass breakthrough” - Starlink became synonymous with satellite internet. But rapid growth also brought its own problem: today, SpaceX simultaneously operates several generations of satellites with different capabilities. This is both flexibility and a major headache.
Kuiper is the youngest of the trio. Amazon started later but used the lessons of both predecessors. Three altitudes were immediately announced, optical links on board, its own Prometheus ASIC with terabit processing, and integration with the AWS cloud. Where OneWeb bet on partners, and Starlink - on the speed of mass launches, Kuiper from the beginning is building a vertically integrated ecosystem: from chips and terminals to data centers and client services. In some respects, it is even more modern than Starlink - precisely because of the “late start.”
Thus, the three systems are not just competitors on the same playing field. They are three stages of one story. And to understand their current strengths and weaknesses, you have to take this temporal context into account: who started earlier, what compromises were inevitable then, and how they now affect the architecture and capabilities of the networks.
Why you can’t just count satellites
“We will have ten thousand satellites!” - that’s how headlines sound, which are easy to be misled by. To a non-specialist, everything looks simple: more satellites = better network. But in satellite internet, arithmetic doesn’t work directly. The key question is not how many metal boxes are flying overhead, but what each of them can do and how they are stitched together.
Imagine two scenarios. In one - you have hundreds of light satellites, each with fixed beams, no laser links, and a limited ability to transmit traffic further than to the nearest ground station. In the second - a smaller number of heavier satellites, but with powerful phased array antennas, flexible beam-hopping, and inter-satellite channels at hundreds of gigabits. The first network on paper may look more massive, but during peak hours in a metropolis or over an air route, the second will handle the load better, even with fewer “bodies” in the sky.
There are at least four reasons why simple counting is misleading:
Beam density is more important than the number of satellites. A single satellite with a hundred narrow beams can serve thousands of users in a city better than a few “old” ones with a dozen wide ones.
Ground infrastructure creates bottlenecks. If there are not enough gateways or powerful inter-satellite links, additional satellites will not help - traffic will hit a “bottleneck.”
Spectrum is a limited resource. The FCC and ITU regulate power and frequencies. Additional satellites will not expand the bandwidth if it is already exhausted.
Distribution policies and network generations. A network with different versions of satellites may have compatibility issues. Sometimes this even limits capabilities, instead of increasing them.
So, the “number of satellites” is more an indicator of the scale of production and launches than of service quality. To really understand whose network is more powerful, you need to look at the orbital architecture, antenna flexibility, spectrum, and how the system copes precisely where demand is highest. And that’s exactly what we’ll analyze next.
Orbital Architecture
When they say “LEO,” a single “low orbit” is imagined. In fact, it is a whole set of altitudes and inclinations that determine how satellites will “hug” the Earth. For the user, these are imperceptible details, but they are the ones that determine whether they will have a stable connection over Paris, the Atlantic, or in northern Finland.
OneWeb chose an altitude of about 1200 km and almost polar inclinations. This means global coverage, including Arctic regions. But altitude comes at a price: higher signal latency and fewer opportunities for spectrum reuse. And most importantly - in the first-generation satellites (Gen1), optical links are absent, so the entire network depends on ground gateways. On paper, it looks beautiful: a full “cap” over the planet. In practice - a huge dependence on where and how many ground stations are actually built.
Starlink went a different way: lower altitudes - about 530–570 km - and several shells with different inclinations. This gives lower latency and better beam density in “hot zones.” But at the same time, it creates a new challenge: SpaceX simultaneously operates several generations of satellites with different sets of capabilities. Some are without ISL, some are with them. The company is already planning even heavier satellites of the next generation (V3) and has even applied for more than 14 thousand satellites for direct communication with smartphones (Direct-to-Cell). This means that the fleet is turning into a complex zoo, where management and updating require enormous resources. SpaceX’s bet from the very beginning is not just presence, but domination. But the scale and speed forced them to make compromises, and where there is a compromise, there is always an opportunity for competitors.
Kuiper entered the game later and immediately bet on a multi-layered approach: three shells - 590, 610, and 630 km. This architecture allows for flexible balancing of coverage and capacity, reinforcing “hot latitudes” and at the same time avoiding excessive duplication of trajectories. And unlike OneWeb, Kuiper from the start equips satellites with optical links, which means traffic can travel “in the sky,” bypassing scarce gateways.
Altitude, inclination, the number of planes - these are not abstract numbers. They determine the “geography of service availability”: whether you can rely on the network on a polar flight, how low the latency will be, and whether there will be enough resources in a metropolis during peak hours. And this is where it becomes clear how different the approaches of the three players are - from the outdated Gen1 in OneWeb, to the complex multi-generational Starlink fleet, to the modern multi-layered Kuiper architecture.
Spectrum and Regulation
If orbits define the “geography” of the network, then the spectrum defines its “language.” In space, you can’t just take and broadcast on any frequency: everything is strictly regulated by international structures at the level of the ITU, the American FCC, and their regulatory counterparts in other countries.
What do Ku and Ka mean for the user?
Ku (10–14 GHz) - the classic “workhorse” of satellite internet. The signal is more resistant to rain and snow, the equipment is historically cheaper, but the available spectrum is limited, and the channels are narrower. This means stability, but it is more difficult to scale capacity in peak areas.
Ka (18–30 GHz) - the “high-speed lane.” Here there is more spectrum and wider channels, which allows reaching hundreds of megabits and even gigabits per user. But the signal is more sensitive to atmospheric phenomena, and the network requires more careful engineering to ensure stability.
That is why the choice of band is always a compromise between stability and speed. And this is exactly what explains why different operators make different bets.
Starlink from the beginning works in a bundle of bands: users connect via Ku, gateways use Ka. Subsequently, SpaceX expanded its arsenal and received permits to use E-band (71–76 and 81–86 GHz) for backhaul, and in filings, also mentioned other bands - including V-band. This provides a reserve for capacity and the potential for high-speed links, but also brings additional challenges: frequencies have “neighbors” in the form of ground microwave systems, and different generations of satellites use different sets of bands, which complicates compatibility.
OneWeb in its first generation did it simpler: Ku for users (uplink 14.0–14.5 GHz, downlink 10.7–12.7 GHz) and Ka for gateways (27.5–29.1 and 29.5–30.0 GHz). This choice reduced technical risks at the start but left the network less flexible than its competitors: there are fewer bands, the possibilities for reuse are limited, and in “hot zones,” “bottlenecks” quickly arise. Gen2 will expand this arsenal in the future, but today OneWeb lives within these two main bands.
Kuiper from the very beginning chose the Ka-band for both users and gateways. This is not a coincidence but a bet on speed as a competitive advantage: Ka has more spectrum and wider channels, which allows for planning high throughput from the start. Amazon has already demonstrated real results - tests have achieved 1.2 Gbps on client terminals. But they are not stopping there: filings have been submitted for spectrum expansion for the next generation (Kuiper-V) with the addition of V-band and Ku-band channels. This opens up space for further capacity building, if regulators give the “green light.”
All these decisions are limited by the strict PFD (Power Flux Density) constraints: even with a thousand satellites, you can’t just “turn up the volume” of the signal - you have to share resources and build complex strategies for reusing bands. This is where the quality of antennas and the ability to “slice” beams becomes critical: whoever does it better, wins.
So, in the spectrum, there are no simple winners. Starlink has the largest set of bands but also the greatest complexity of integration. OneWeb is limited to stable Ku/Ka but without a reserve for flexible growth. Kuiper bet on Ka and has already confirmed high speed with real-world tests, while preparing to also enter the V- and Ku-bands.
Satellite Antennas, Beams, and Beam Hopping
A satellite without an antenna is like a flashlight without a reflector: it shines, but not where it needs to and not in the right way. All three players use phased array antennas (AESA), but with very different logic. This is where it becomes clear why the number of satellites in the sky means nothing without the high-quality “slicing” of beams.
OneWeb in the first generation took the simplest path: fixed beams. Each satellite forms 16 Ku-beams and separate Ka-beams for gateways. This was a normal engineering choice in the mid-2010s, but today it looks like a limitation. Fixed beams do not allow for redistributing capacity during peak hours: if users “fall out” of one spot, the resource is lost, and another may be overloaded. That is why OneWeb is much more dependent on the number and location of ground stations.
Starlink immediately incorporated greater flexibility. In Gen1, these were basic electronically steered beams, but in Gen2 (V2 Mini Optimized), full-fledged beam hopping is used: the satellite can “illuminate” hundreds of narrow spots and dynamically reallocate capacity. In “hot zones,” the beams are simply “compressed” and sliced more densely, in less loaded areas - they are stretched. This allows for more efficient work than simply “putting up more satellites.” But the downside is that different generations have different capabilities, so the network has to coordinate satellites with simpler and more advanced antennas.
Kuiper used the “advantage of being late.” Amazon bet on the Prometheus ASIC - a specialized processor that can process a terabit stream on board the satellite. This means not only more beams but also more flexible logic for their formation. Beam hopping here is not an additional function, but a fundamental part of the architecture: the system itself decides where to direct the capacity, in what format, and with what prioritization. As a result, Kuiper immediately got the ability to slice hundreds of dynamic beams and increase productivity even in overloaded regions.
The choice of antennas and the way they work with beams is what distinguishes an “outdated” architecture from a modern one. OneWeb still lives in the logic of static beams, Starlink has long since switched to flexible beam hopping, and Kuiper is starting immediately with the most modern concept. And when we talk about “network quality,” this ability to “illuminate where it’s needed” often matters more than the number in the “number of satellites” column.
Ground Infrastructure and the Cloud
Satellites are only half the network. The other half lives on Earth: these are gateway stations, fiber optic channels, and data centers. And this is where the difference between the three systems is even more noticeable than in orbit.
OneWeb from the very beginning bet on a classic architecture: without inter-satellite links in Gen1, traffic must go down to the nearest gateway. This means that for global operation, the network needs a dense grid of stations. Each country has its own regulator, its own permits, its own partners. As a result, OneWeb is more dependent on geopolitics and local markets: if there are few gateways or they are in bad locations, the service sags. Today, there are about 40 gateway stations in operation, with several more in the process of being launched.
Starlink went a different way from the start. Yes, in the first generations there was also an emphasis on gateways, but with Gen2, optical ISLs appeared, and now traffic can travel “in the sky,” bypassing the limitations of ground geography. The scale is impressive: the network already has ≈9,000 laser links, through which more than 42 petabytes of data pass daily with over 99% stability. This is essentially a “celestial backhaul” that removes the dependence on the density of ground nodes. However, gateways still remain an important part of the architecture: in the US, there are more than 100 gateway sites with more than a thousand and a half antennas; globally, according to unofficial maps, there are about 150.
Kuiper immediately started with a comprehensive strategy. Amazon plans to build 300–350 gateway stations worldwide, but this is only part of the picture. The main trump card is integration with AWS. While SpaceX is building its own data center backend practically from scratch, Amazon already has a global network of data centers, hundreds of PoPs, and ready channels. This means that Kuiper can immediately connect the satellite segment to a proven cloud infrastructure. For corporate clients, this is a huge argument: you get satellite internet that is “out of the box” stitched together with the same cloud where your business and services already work.
In ground infrastructure, there is no universal model. OneWeb lives in the world of gateways and resellers. Starlink combines gateways and ISLs, gradually moving away from “ground dependency.” Kuiper immediately builds a hybrid: a dense network of stations + a powerful AWS cloud. And this is where it becomes clear that the competition takes place not only in orbit but also in data centers and fiber backbones.
Client Terminals
For the user, a “satellite network” does not start from orbit, but from a box on the roof or an antenna near the house. It is the client terminal that determines how easy it is to connect, what speed can actually be obtained, and how much it all costs.
OneWeb has focused on the corporate and government segments. Terminals here are heavier, more expensive, and mostly professional. At the same time, the company has effectively handed over the terminal market to partners - various equipment manufacturers and distributors. This creates a field for technical and market competition, which will sooner or later benefit consumers. But the reality is harsh: the powerful start of Starlink, and now the entry of Kuiper with a certain price dumping, have seriously limited the maneuver space for OneWeb’s partners.
Starlink chose the opposite strategy - to make the antenna as consumer-friendly as possible and at the same time aggressively subsidize its price. It is known that the first generations of terminals were sold significantly below cost, but this allowed SpaceX to quickly “bite off” a lion’s share of the global B2C market. This tactic could have cost no less than classic advertising and distribution development, but it turned out to be much more effective: the company immediately created a de facto monopoly in the mass segment. For the user, this meant - “here’s a box, connect and work,” without long negotiations and tenders. And although it was painful for finances at the start, scaled production quickly reduced the cost, and now the terminals are probably already approaching the “green zone.”
Kuiper is only at the start, but Amazon has already presented its terminals: a compact one for the home user, a more powerful one for small businesses, and a high-performance one for corporate and government clients. All of them are built on Amazon’s own chips, optimized for working with the Ka-band. But there is a strategic nuance: Kuiper is forced to enter the market in a situation where Starlink has already created the status quo. This means that Amazon will most likely also be forced to sell terminals below cost for some time - at least until the scale of production allows it to reach a financially stable “green zone.” At the same time, integration with AWS opens up additional value for corporate clients that Starlink does not offer.
Both SpaceX and Amazon have made significant efforts to achieve engineering results in the development of terminals with AESA. They have managed to achieve previously unseen miniaturization and adaptation of production technologies, but no real scientific breakthroughs have occurred here. This is more of an engineering and design work using existing solutions. The most difficult part is heat dissipation: the compact placement of AESA antennas along with powerful computing electronics leads to a very low efficiency level - only 3–7%. This means that most of the energy goes into heat, and the task of effective cooling remains one of the most difficult challenges for the entire industry.
The client terminal is not just an antenna, but also an interface to the network world. OneWeb is still playing in the “heavyweight” for corporations. Starlink bet on the mass segment and dominated thanks to dumping and scaling. Kuiper is entering later but immediately combines its own chips and cloud integration, even if it requires financial sacrifices at the start. And the engineering compromises in the field of AESA show: the real competition here is still ahead.
Scaling and Generation Integration
A LEO network is not a static structure. Satellites work for only a few years, after which they need to be replaced. So any project is doomed to constant renewal from the very beginning. And this is where it turns out how difficult it is to stitch different generations into one working system.
Starlink feels this challenge the most. Today, the fleet has several “families” of satellites: from Gen1 without optical links, through intermediate models, to the new V2 Mini Optimized with a full set of ISLs and an expanded spectrum. On the horizon, even heavier V3 satellites and a separate “constellation within a constellation” for Direct-to-Cell are already looming - more than 14 thousand declared satellites. This is a real zoo where different generations with different capabilities work simultaneously. The advantage is that SpaceX can scale the network almost continuously. The disadvantage is the growing complexity of management and potential failures at the interfaces of generations.
The intensive evolution of Starlink has another dark side: global failures. They do not happen every day, but they are not rare either - several times a year, users around the world experience significant service interruptions. The reasons are different - from software updates to a transition to new generations of satellites, but the result is the same: a mass service for tens of millions of users becomes vulnerable even to small management errors. This is a kind of “price of speed” that SpaceX pays.
OneWeb is still living with Gen1, but also faces the challenge of scaling. Gen2 is planned with ISLs and an expanded spectrum, and the company will have to integrate it so that the user does not feel a “quality drop.” Here there is the advantage of a “clean slate” - you can immediately make more modern satellites without the baggage of old generations. But there is also a risk: as long as only Gen1 is in the sky, the network looks outdated against the backdrop of competitors.
Kuiper has the simplest situation - because it starts later. They are immediately launching the first generation with ISLs, modern antennas, and a well-thought-out architecture. This allows them to avoid a “zoo” and build the system more evenly. However, Amazon will have to go through the same stages in the future: satellites are not eternal, and in 5-7 years, replacement will begin.
Scaling is not just about quantity. It is also a matter of integration: how to make old and new satellites work together, how to minimize failures, how not to get confused in different sets of functions. In Starlink, this is already visible: some satellites carry traffic via ISL, some - only through gateways. For OneWeb and Kuiper, this challenge is still ahead, but it cannot be avoided. And this is where it becomes clear that domination in quantity does not yet guarantee domination in quality.
Strategy and Ecosystem
A LEO constellation is not just about satellites and antennas. It is always part of a broader strategy: who controls the market, what services are offered, how the ecosystem is built. And here, the approaches of the three players differ dramatically.
OneWeb from the beginning was a project with a branched network of partners. The company not only delegated the production of terminals to various suppliers but also effectively handed over regional sales to resellers. This made OneWeb more dependent on the partner ecosystem, but at the same time created a classic competitive environment for equipment and services. In the long run, the consumer can benefit from such a model, but in practice, the powerful start of Starlink and the arrival of Kuiper have significantly reduced OneWeb’s chances of “skimming the cream” in the mass market.
Starlink chose the diametrically opposite path - maximum control. Satellites, their launch rockets, terminals, and even the software architecture - everything is under the SpaceX roof. This allowed the company to act aggressively: subsidize terminals, increase the number of satellites at a frantic pace, and offer the consumer simple and direct access to the service. Starlink became a de facto B2C monopolist in satellite internet. The aggressive market entry had a global effect: in the last four years alone, the prices for satellite internet worldwide have dropped by an order of magnitude, and now even traditional operators are forced to rebuild their business models. But there is another nuance here: SpaceX thinks broader. They have positioned Starlink from the very beginning as “space infrastructure” that can also be sold to other players. An example is the use of inter-satellite laser links not only for their own traffic but also potentially as a service for other satellites. Add to this native IPv6 support, and we see that Starlink is being designed as a global platform, not just an “internet provider.”
Kuiper is taking a third path - a combination of complete control and reliance on the existing Amazon business ecosystem. Satellites, terminals, gateways - all are proprietary. But the main thing is integration with AWS. This means that a corporate client will not just get a “channel in space,” but a channel that is “out of the box” built into their cloud infrastructure. And here Amazon has a trump card that no one else has: the company is already rooted in dozens of countries around the world with its branched network of warehouses, data centers, services, and logistics. Where SpaceX has to invest in everything - from representation to sales tools and local infrastructure, Amazon just needs to add a thin layer of “satellite superstructure” to its existing business. This sharply reduces the barriers to market entry and makes Kuiper a global project from day one. And although the main competition for Kuiper will obviously take place in the B2B and B2G segments, the company’s ambitions indicate that Amazon is ready to fight for a significant share of the B2C market, using its experience in retail and a colossal client base.
So, we have three different strategies. OneWeb - a network of partners and resellers. Starlink - a vertically integrated machine with ambitions of global infrastructure. Kuiper - a space segment that is immediately “stitched” with the most powerful cloud on the planet, reinforced by Amazon’s real global presence and supported by the readiness to enter the B2C market. And this is where it becomes clear that the fight is not only for the user with an antenna on the roof but also for control over what the global internet ecosystem will look like in the coming decades.
Economics and Resilience
Launching satellites is only half the battle. The real battle is for who can make the network financially sustainable: reduce the cost, recoup investments, and maintain a competitive price for the user.
OneWeb went through a difficult and dramatic path. The project effectively went bankrupt in 2020 and was saved thanks to government injections (primarily from the British government), and later - thanks to European and international consortiums. The last step was a merger with the French Eutelsat, which gave the company a new name and a new financial basis. But this “still life” of owners does not add speed to decision-making. On the contrary, Eutelsat OneWeb looks heavy and conservative against the backdrop of competitors: the business structure is complex, the market is mainly B2B and B2G, and decisions are made slowly. This provides a certain stability but limits the possibilities for maneuver and rapid scaling.
Starlink bet on an aggressive start and subsidies. Terminals were sold significantly below cost, and the costs of launching satellites were effectively subsidized by other SpaceX projects - primarily commercial launches. But the strategy worked: thanks to the scaling of production and dozens of launches on its own Falcon 9, the cost is gradually decreasing. At the same time, Starlink has already reached millions of users and stable cash flow.
The historical role of Ukraine remains underestimated here. It was the intensive and effective use of Starlink by the country’s defenders that became perhaps the best real-world demonstration of the technology’s potential. This use created a unique set of challenges - from cyberattacks and EW attempts to direct countermeasures from Russian state structures. As a result, SpaceX hardened both its own technologies and its team of specialists, learning to repel attacks and increasing the system’s resilience. But there is another side: Elon Musk’s unilateral decisions to limit Starlink’s availability in the occupied territories caused a loud international reaction. For many governments, this became a signal: it is too dangerous to rely on one private provider. And it was this that spurred the development of alternatives - from the activation of investors in OneWeb to the plans for new national and regional constellations.
Kuiper has a different balance. On the one hand, Amazon must invest billions in launch and production. For this, the company has pre-booked more than 80 launches from several suppliers: ULA (Vulcan), Arianespace (Ariane 6), and Blue Origin (New Glenn). This is the largest commercial launch contract in history, and it shows the scale of Kuiper’s ambitions. But the key problem is that the main “workhorses” - Vulcan and New Glenn - have not yet gone through the entire testing cycle. So Amazon has to plan deployment based on the expectation of when the partner’s rockets will finally be ready for regular work.
Amazon has a significant advantage: huge financial resources and a ready-made AWS cloud infrastructure. This allows it to “digest” the costs longer and more painlessly than its competitors. In the short term, terminals and services will likely also be sold below cost to enter the market. But in the long term, Kuiper can become self-sufficient precisely because of its integration with Amazon’s existing business - where satellite internet will not be a separate product, but another layer of a global ecosystem.
The economics of LEO networks is always a balance between capital and speed. OneWeb - stability through consortiums and state support, but limited flexibility. Starlink - domination through subsidies, scaling, and combat hardening in Ukraine, and at the same time, the risk of a monopoly that stimulates the emergence of competitors. Kuiper - financial power and integration with the Amazon business empire, which allows it to withstand a long game, albeit with a dependence on the readiness of new partner rockets.
The broader context is also important. In recent years, the space and satellite industry has lowered the “price threshold” for entry: announcements of new LEO projects no longer surprise anyone. Ambitious players such as Telesat Lightspeed, Rivada, Kepler Communications, as well as “pocket” startups with dozens of nanosatellites, are appearing on the market. China is also openly demonstrating its ambitions - from the state program Guowang (tens of thousands of satellites) to commercial initiatives by Geely (Geespace) and other private companies. Forecasts speak of more than 100,000 satellites in orbit by the end of 2030. But despite this barrage of announcements, the largest part of this number will likely belong to the three giants: Starlink (with a declared 40-50 thousand satellites), Kuiper (more than 3 thousand), and OneWeb (several thousand). So, by the end of the decade, they will be the ones who will determine the look and economics of the market, while the rest of the players will occupy niche segments.
Conclusions
When we talk about satellite mega-constellations, the biggest temptation is to count the number of satellites. Whoever has more is stronger. But this is a false logic. The reality is much more complex: the success of a network is determined not by the number of satellites, but by how the entire ecosystem is built - from the architecture of the satellites and ground infrastructure to the business model and strategic vision.
Starlink created the largest and most powerful fleet, became a monopolist in the mass segment, and literally “collapsed” prices for satellite internet worldwide. But at the same time, it also got a zoo of generations, a problem with failures, and a dependence on the personal decisions of Elon Musk, which cause waves of reactions in global politics.
Eutelsat OneWeb survived bankruptcy, rescue with state money, and a merger. This made the company cautious, even overly so - in a world where speed has become the main asset. The bet on the B2B and B2G segments provides stability but takes away the chance for mass expansion.
Kuiper is starting later but has a resource cushion that no one else has. Amazon can afford long investment cycles, and Kuiper’s main strength is in its merger with the existing business empire: AWS, logistics, e-commerce. It’s not just a satellite network, but a superstructure over a gigantic global infrastructure.
Together, they form the core of a new satellite world. And it is they, not dozens of smaller projects, who will determine the look of the orbits by the end of the decade. Because even if in the 2030s we really have more than 100,000 satellites in orbit, a significant part of that number will belong to them.
So, the question “who will win?” cannot be reduced to arithmetic. It is a question of architectures, economics, and strategies. And for now, one thing can be said: those who can turn a constellation of satellites into a true global ecosystem will dominate. And it is this race that we are witnessing right now.
For those interested in more in-depth analytics, developing informational or training materials, or conducting seminars — you can reach out at volodymyr@stepanets.eu.
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